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IN DEFENSE OF NOT DEFENDING KANT’S RELIGION
Gordon E. Michalson, Jr.

This essay underscores the significant contribution Firestone and Jacobs
make through the very thorough way their book surveys the wide range of
recent scholarship bearing on Kant’s Religion. The essay then argues, however, that the complex scaffolding designed to summarize and categorize
the varied responses to Kant has the effect of muting the authors’ own very
bold interpretive stance. This point is particularly true with respect to their
account of the compatibility of Kant’s Religion with the Christian tradition.
In addition, the essay suggests that the judicial metaphor of “defense” is
overplayed, forcing certain interpretations of Kant into potentially misleading positions for the sake of the interpretive scheme.

I
In a comment only a professor would make, theologian Hans Frei once
said that Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason “is a book I
would pack for a long stay on a desert island.”1 The obvious implication
is that Kant’s book is a virtually inexhaustible source of interpretive possibilities to which one can return again and again, always discovering
something fresh, new, and stimulating.
Interpretive developments associated with Kant’s Religion in recent
decades amply reinforce Frei’s underlying point. In particular, since the
publication of Allen Wood’s Kant’s Moral Religion in 1970,2 the world of
English-speaking Kant scholarship has witnessed an impressive stream
of individual works of interpretation of Kant’s religious thought, several
anthologies of penetrating essays, countless journal articles, and two new
translations of Religion itself. Perhaps the outstanding feature of the resulting dialogue is the wide range of viewpoints and the resulting absence of
any clear interpretive consensus forming around one reading of Religion.
Such a record suggests that Kant’s book is indeed an invitation to openended debate, sustained by multiple interpretive interests.
1
Hans W. Frei, Types of Christian Theology, ed. George Hunsinger and William C. Placher
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 58.
2
Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1970). Wood’s most recent contribution to the matters at hand is “Kant and the Intelligibility of Evil” in Kant’s Anatomy of Evil ed. Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 144–172.
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Amidst these complexities, Chris Firestone and Nathan Jacobs have
rendered the enormous service of identifying, clarifying, and evaluating a broad spectrum of these interpretative responses to Kant’s Religion.
They undertake this already large task with the ultimate aim of advancing an ambitious interpretive program of their own. Whatever additional
judgments one might make about In Defense of Kant’s Religion,3 the book’s
value as a way of accessing and comparing varied interpretations of Religion is beyond question. It is just the sort of book one wants to put in the
hands of students who are grappling with interpretive issues associated
with Kant’s religious thought.
More importantly, Firestone and Jacobs integrate their taxonomy of interpretive approaches to Kant’s text with their own sustained emphasis on
at least three important points: the unity and argumentative coherence of
Religion, the book’s consistency with the critical philosophy overall, and,
finally, its general compatibility with a Christian theological result. The
authors promote these important themes largely through the systematic
development of resources in the critical philosophy and in Religion itself,
including Kant’s notion of pure cognition, the two “experiments” Kant
mentions in the Second Edition Preface of Religion, and his account of the
moral disposition. They make the case that these features of Kant’s argument are present at the earliest stages of Religion and are crucial to keep
in mind throughout in order to understand the text as a coherent work
of philosophy of religion (6–7).4 Competently pursuing this ambitious
agenda, Firestone and Jacobs have themselves added profitably to the
range of interpretive options coming under a student’s scrutiny. The fact
that, by my reading of their book, the authors believe that their approach
eliminates or otherwise domesticates the most serious problems raised by
other interpretations of Kant’s Religion simply underscores the ambition of
their project. Coupled with this point is the fact that Firestone and Jacobs
sustain welcome attention on Kant’s text itself, requiring those who may
disagree with them to do the same.
In what follows, I want to structure my discussion in terms of a reservation about IDKR that is perhaps really an indirect way of promoting
my admiration for a cardinal feature of the authors’ position. There is a
layered quality associated with their own positive assessment of Kant’s
Religion, with some aspects of their position—such as their argument on
behalf of the unity of the book—more specialized and technical in nature
than others and of likely interest to fewer readers. But I think the feature
3
Chris L. Firestone and Nathan Jacobs, In Defense of Kant’s Religion (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008). Hereafter referred to as IDKR, with page
numbers indicated in brackets within my text.
4
The authors’ interest in understanding Religion in terms of its connections with the
critical philosophy as a whole finds an interesting parallel in Pablo Muchnik’s recent effort
to display the “systematic” importance within Kant’s overall philosophy of his theory of
radical evil. Muchnik, Kant’s Theory of Evil: An Essay on the Dangers of Self-Love and the Aprioricity of History (Lanham, MD.: Lexington Books, 2009).
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of their book that is at once the broadest and most arresting is their insistence that, correctly understood, “the content of Kant’s arguments begins
to look remarkably Christian” (5). To their credit, Firestone and Jacobs
acknowledge that the relationship between Religion and Christianity is, in
their words, “a mixed bag” (5). They also insist that their primary focus
is on defending “the internal coherence of Religion” rather than on “commending its desirability for Christianity” (6). Still, the authors clearly
view Kant’s work as broadly compatible with Christianity and as a constructive moment in the history of modern Christian thought. Whatever
their interpretive priorities may be, Firestone and Jacobs have an obvious
stake in this presumed compatibility. By my reading of their book, this
feature is the most significant way in which they stand over against much
contemporary interpretation of Kant.
My reservation is that the authors underplay this aspect of their view
of Kant’s Religion for the sake of other matters that are less significant.
Indeed, their provocative interpretive thrust regarding Kant’s relation to
Christianity is considerably obscured by the organizational complexities
of IDKR. Notwithstanding the very real value associated with the canvassing of so many interpretive options, I find that the ultimate effect of
so much organizational scaffolding is to detract from the interpretive interests characterizing the book’s boldest elements. Since the authors’ aims
are so provocative and interesting in and of themselves, they deserve a
bolder presentation unencumbered by an organizational scheme that
threatens to distract.
Embedded in this general reservation is the related fact that, as one
whose own work figures prominently in IDKR, I do not always recognize
my own position, insofar as I am depicted as the “star witness in the case
against Religion” without ever having viewed my own efforts in a prosecutorial mode (4). This point leaves me wondering if there is perhaps a
second sense in which the organizational tactics of the book create unnecessary distraction, as commentators canvassed in the book (or those sympathetic to them) focus on re-stating their own interpretive accounts rather
than on facing squarely what Firestone and Jacobs have to say about Kant
and Christianity. Certainly I find this tempting in my own case, as I surely
never thought of myself as promoting a view against which Kant needs
“defending.” Rather, my intention has always been to locate key issues in
his thought that help us understand why he is so important for grasping the
trajectory of modern religious thought in the West. Put more colloquially,
I thought I was laying out in greater detail the case I’ve always made for
Kant’s importance in the undergraduate survey course on modern religious
thought that I’ve regularly taught since 1975. As one might sense from that
originating context, my aim in part was to explain to restless students why
we absolutely had to read this dry and difficult author before moving on to
the more engaging writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who
had attracted the students to the course in the first place. I always viewed
myself as the one making the case for Kant, not as the one prosecuting him.
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Perhaps ultimately at issue here is the extent to which the motif of a “defense” of Kant has been deployed as a means of categorizing interpreters
of Religion. While I certainly appreciate the tactical advantages provided
by such an approach, the motif ultimately seems overdone, with too much
diverse material forced into boxes for the sake of the scheme. Once again,
a possible effect is to distract readers from the authors’ own bold interpretive stance, leaving commentators responding to just about everything
but what the authors take most seriously. In what follows, then, let me try
to expand on these very general observations.
II
While some contrast with alternative approaches to Religion is obviously
in order as a strategy for highlighting what is distinctive about these authors’ views, the engagement with so many other interpreters is on such
a scale that it threatens to take on a life of its own. We are introduced to a
general breakdown between interpretive trends that are “principally negative toward religion and theology” and those trends that “affirm” religion
and theology, with the former deemed the more “traditional” approach
(1–2). In turn, these two broad categories result in further breakdowns
among interpreters along lines suggested by the key problems concerning
the “metaphysical motives behind Religion” and Religion’s “philosophical
character.” These issues are then carefully explored by working through
in detail those interpreters supposedly hostile to or otherwise critical of
Kant’s efforts, followed by similar accounts of interpreters speaking up in
“defense” of Kant. Two long chapters (chaps. 1–2) devoted to these themes
are then followed by a chapter focusing on “seven core objections” to the
“coherence” of Religion evidently raised by my own work. The remaining
five chapters are then structured in ways that layer and commingle all of
the interpretive options previously surveyed as the means of promoting
the authors’ own constructive viewpoint—their “defense.”
This is a lot of balls to have in the air, particularly as a means, finally,
of promoting a specific interpretive option. Perhaps inevitably, the sheer
thoroughness of the authors’ account of alternative positions turns into an
invitation to distraction from their own main points. The fact that virtually none of the panel discussion devoted to IDKR at the 2009 meeting of
the American Academy of Religion was devoted to Firestone and Jacobs’s
own constructive interpretation of Religion in Chapters 4–8 is suggestive
of the element of distraction. As I have indicated, their primary aim is to
underscore the argumentative coherence of Religion, with the latent associated aim of arguing its theological relevance as well. The canvassing
of interpretive options is instrumental toward these ends. The element of
distraction thus introduced by what is simply intended to be the set-up
for the authors’ ultimate intention is the downside to the impressive comprehensiveness of their dissection of the secondary literature. In short,
Firestone and Jacobs may provide their readers too many excuses to react
to matters other than the ones they take most seriously.
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A good way to expand on this point is to ask: to what degree do the
truly arresting features of the Firestone/Jacobs view of Religion depend for
their clear depiction on the book’s complicated scaffolding? My answer is:
for the most part, not much.
An example would be the astute analysis in Chapter 7 of the relationship between an “individual” and a “corporate” account of moral regeneration. In very general terms, this issue concerns the extent to which
Kant’s postulate of the immortality of the soul in the Critique of Practical
Reason has been supplemented or perhaps even surpassed by his concept
of the “ethical community” or commonwealth in Religion. That way of
putting the matter illuminates the difference between an account of the
perfection of virtue that is strictly individual in nature (the “duration”
involved in Kant’s account of the immortality of the soul) and an account
that is social or interpersonal in nature (the development within history
of the ethical community).
In both cases, the thorny issue of moral conversion is at issue. Against
the background of the desperate situation confronting the moral agent in
the grip of a freely-chosen evil disposition—an evil, that is, that is “radical”—Kant’s depiction of moral conversion is as important for his overall
position as it is complex in its rendering. In recent years, several interpreters have made an interesting case for the broader social frame of reference that the ethical community offers for understanding “progress”
toward moral conversion and moral conversion itself.5 The implication
is that corporate endeavor somehow succeeds in offsetting the debility
associated with radical evil and becomes the locus of a rationally-based
moral “hope.”6 Kant’s own explicit suggestion that God is the “lawgiver”
of the ethical community7—an idea that Jerome Schneewind describes
as Kant’s “astonishing claim” that we and God are moral partners8—underscores the interesting shift potentially at stake as we move from a
personal/individual to a corporate/social context for considering moral
conversion.9 This approach implies an emerging fresh solution to the
problem of moral conversion.
5
E.g., Sharon Anderson-Gold, Unnecessary Evil: History and Moral Progress in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001); Peter Byrne,
The Moral Interpretation of Religion (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmann, 1998); Philip J. Rossi,
S.J., The Social Authority of Reason: Kant’s Critique, Radical Evil, and the Destiny of Humankind
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).
6
This is the flip side of the question of the impact, if any, of the social dimension on
the fall into radical evil, an issue that has recently been helpfully discussed by Jeanine M.
Grenberg, “Social Dimensions of Kant’s Conception of Radical Evil,” in Anderson-Gold
and Muchnik, Kant’s Anatomy, 173–194.
7
Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in Religion and Rational
Theology, ed. A. W. Wood and G. di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 133–134.
8
J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 512.
9
Gordon E. Michalson, Jr., “God and Kant’s Ethical Commonwealth,” The Thomist 65
(January 2001), 67–92.
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As one who is generally sympathetic with this shift to the social frame
of reference—viewing it as Kant’s extended commentary on his own third
version of the categorical imperative (“Every rational being must act as if
he, by his maxims, were at all times a legislative member in the universal
realm of ends”),10 I have to concede the importance of the Firestone/Jacobs
rejoinder: “Prior to suggesting that humans must band together in pursuit
of moral redemption . . . Kant must first establish that moral redemption
is somehow possible” despite the debilitating effects of radical evil laid
out in the same book (183). In other words, the sum-of-the-parts provided
by the corporate perspective leaves unanswered the question of how a
moral agent achieves moral regeneration. To assume otherwise may be
to avoid the real issue by changing the subject. One is reminded here of
Kierkegaard’s tavern owner who sold beer for a penny less than he paid
for it. When asked how he remained solvent on that basis, he replied: “It’s
the big number that does it.”11 Similarly, the shift from the individual to
the corporate perspective may bring into view an important dimension of
Kant’s concept of rational hope, but it does not finally address Kant’s own
question concerning how “it is possible that a naturally evil human being
should make himself into a good human being.”12
Firestone and Jacobs ultimately develop their position on the individual vs. corporate perspective in ways closely associated with their aggressively constructive view of Kant’s Christology, which is the locus of their
provocative effort to read into Religion what they call a “prototypical theology” (154–155). In a creative move, they fold together the issue of moral
conversion and the themes of atonement and grace running through the
authors’ depiction in the previous chapter of Jesus as the “prototype” of
a moral disposition totally pleasing to God (chap. 6). Eventually supplemented in Chapter 8 by the authors’ strikingly positive view of Book Four
of Religion, the interpretive result includes a transposition of Kant’s allusions to the social or corporate dimension into a more significant role for
ecclesiology to play than most other interpreters ascribe to Kant’s position.
As these interpretive pieces fall serially into place, the authors provide a
very interesting case for viewing Kant’s relation to revealed or historical
religion in more positive terms than generally supposed—which is probably the sort of thing Nicholas Wolterstorff had in mind when he stated in
his “Foreword” to IDKR that the Kant we meet in the pages of this book
is a bit “strange” (xii).
In effect, then, Firestone and Jacobs have done something quite breathtaking; they have provided what can only be called a revisionist account
of Kant’s view of the relation between reason and revelation. This is a
10
See my discussion of this point in chaps. 4–5 of Kant and the Problem of God (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1999).
11
A Kierkegaard Anthology, ed. Robert Bretall (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1951), 438.
12
Kant, Religion, 90.
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significant interpretive option warranting careful consideration by those
who may disagree. My point here is not to debate its merits but simply to
raise the question of whether or not the book’s complex organizational
design is necessary to bring this significant point into the light of day—
or whether, instead, it partially obscures it. The issue, in other words, is
whether or not the best parts of the book stand sufficiently free from the
book’s organizational imperatives to be fully appreciated. By embedding
their key points in so much interpretive give-and-take, Firestone and
Jacobs potentially compromise their ability to give center stage to the
leading features of their own position.
This specific instance is surely a reflection of the more comprehensive
issue at stake here, which concerns Firestone and Jacobs’s view of Kant’s
relationship to Christianity in general. Here they have some invariably
controversial things to say. Indeed, even if their views on this matter are
secondary to their interest in the unity of Religion, I find their position
on Kant’s relation to Christianity to be the driving force associated with
their most significant claims. This point comes through in their account
of Book Four of Religion in Chapter 8, an account that is of particular interest, since, as they point out, this is “the least studied Book of Religion”
(210). Most commentators assume that Book Four is where Kant whittles
away at religious zealotry, pseudo-worship of God, and enthusiastic
excess in further defense of his rather austere moral/rationalist undertaking—something of a mop-up operation that kills off the lingering targets
following the work of the previous three Books. Firestone and Jacobs offer
a more constructive viewpoint, linked with their fresh approach to the
so-called “experiments” in terms of which Kant depicts the aims of Religion in the Second Edition Preface, and also with their effort to depict the
“prototypical theology” emerging especially from the aggressive reading
of Kant’s discussion of Jesus as the moral prototype. Here, their underlying effort to show that Kant’s Religion is “not only coherent, but also
religiously and theologically affirmative” (233), stakes out the interpretive
ground that in my view matters the most. Once again, I simply raise the
question of whether or not so much organizational complexity is necessary to bring the authors’ most substantive points into view, or if instead
the complexity compromises this very effort.
III
I indicated at the outset that the element of distraction associated with
IDKR’s organizational scheme is perhaps compounded by the imperative
to force so many interpretive options into a format dictated by judicial
metaphors. I surely sense this problem with respect to the way my own
work is deployed in the book. Before I pursue this point, let me state unambiguously my deep appreciation for having my own attempts to write
some clear things about complicated matters taken in a serious way and
in such a generous spirit. On specific issues of interpretation, as well as in
connection with my understanding of Religion taken as a whole, Firestone
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and Jacobs have given me a great deal on which to reflect, including the
issue of Kant’s Christology and the best way to read Book Four. Still, when
I find myself characterized as the “prosecution’s star witness” (83) who
“casts a shadow of suspicion over the argumentative specifics” of Kant’s
Religion (6), I find myself recalling Belgian surrealist René Magritte who,
whenever told what the “meaning” of one of his paintings was, reportedly said: “You are more fortunate than I am.”13
My overall sense in the current case is that a certain amount of slippage
has occurred between the idea that Kant needs defending from what I
write about Religion and the idea that Firestone and Jacobs need defending,
due to our differing interpretive aims. They are quite right in depicting
my approach to Kant’s account of radical evil and moral regeneration in
terms of a “nest of tangles” riddled with “inconsistencies” that ultimately
lead to a set of “wobbles” in Kant’s overall view of radical evil and moral
recovery. As they correctly see, I argue that a pattern of wobbling emerges
in connection with some truly key elements within Kant’s position.
For example, Kant claims that humankind has an “original predisposition to good” but a “natural propensity to evil,” that radical evil is “innate” but “brought upon us by ourselves” through our freedom, that we
are morally obligated to deliver ourselves from radical evil, even though
it is “inextirpable by human powers,” and that we ourselves must “make
ourselves” good again, but that divine aid “may be necessary” to our
actually becoming good.14 To depict the cumulative effect of Kant’s position in terms of “wobbling” may not be the most elegant way to address
these complexities. However, the metaphor is designed to shed light, not
simply on Kant’s position, but on the larger transitional issues suggested
by Richard Rorty’s observation that “interesting philosophy is rarely an
examination of the pros and cons of a thesis. Usually it is, implicitly or
explicitly, a contest between an entrenched vocabulary which has become
a nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely promises
great things.”15 Kant’s is nothing if not “interesting philosophy,” and I am
simply suggesting that something like the contest depicted by Rorty is at
the source of the instability in Kant’s Religion, as Kant tries to reconcile his
received biblical idiom with the emerging vocabulary of an autonomous
rationality. In a rather rough sense, this is my way of understanding the
cumbersome title of the book—a title that includes words like “reason”
and “religion.”
Now I certainly have no problem with other commentators on Religion
wanting to smooth out the tensions in Kant’s account for the sake of claiming more stability for his position than I see. But at no point do I frame my
Suzi Gablik, Magritte (London: Thames and Hudson, 1970), 10.
Gordon E. Michalson, Jr., Fallen Freedom: Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 8.
15
Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989), 9
13
14
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own discussion in prosecutorial terms. Rather, I frame it in terms of my
own clearly stated overall interpretive aim, which is to un-pack Kant’s position as a telling indicator in the modern West’s search for a “substitute
for supernaturalism” in the account of transcendence and divine action.
In my view, Kant’s emphasis on human autonomy is his version of that
very search. Put differently, I’m attempting to view Kant through the lens
of a certain thought experiment, which is to consider “the history of religious thought in the West since about 1750 as an ongoing referendum on
the idea of ‘otherworldliness.’”16 Kant’s own vote in that referendum is, in
my view, particularly telling for the light it sheds on subsequent religious
thought, as modern religious thinkers strive to reconcile continuity with
biblical tradition with intelligibility within the context of modernity. In
the end, my aim is to illustrate his influence on this challenging mediating
effort and not to “malign” Kant’s text “because of its supposed incoherence,” as the authors put it (232).
After all, viewed historically, the element of instability in, say, Kant’s
account of moral regeneration—with its peculiar mixture of human and
divine elements—is not argumentatively problematic so much as it is richly
and powerfully suggestive. Far from concluding that Kant has fallen into
a set of gross argumentative inconsistencies requiring a defense of his
position, I argue that his position is momentously telling for the way it
indicates deep transitions within the culture, as he tries to do justice to his
own preferred vocabulary of rationality and autonomy while constrained
within his historical setting by biblical patterns of thinking about human
destiny. “Wobbling,” in his case, does not constitute what Firestone and
Jacobs refer to as a “bleak state of affairs” requiring defense (105). Instead,
it is an indicator of something at once deeper and far more important, requiring historical understanding rather than an interpretive straitjacket—
not unlike the historical understanding that is required, say, to appreciate
the French Impressionists’ experiments in painting what the eye actually
sees rather than what the received tradition insists they should paint. As
I put the matter in Fallen Freedom:
Kant’s problem is that the emergent new sensibility is seriously compromised by a received tradition largely antithetical to it: he is not dealing with
philosophical argumentation so much as he is juggling centuries. This is
why it is not adequate to try to rehabilitate the doctrines of the Religion along
purely conceptual and argumentative lines, as contemporary analytic philosophers sometimes try to do with the doctrines of the first Critique.17

By contrast, Firestone and Jacobs concentrate precisely on the rehabilitation of the arguments within Religion, including a strenuous effort to
demonstrate both their mutual consistency and their continuity with the
critical philosophy as a whole. Certainly I am not totally uninterested in
Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 1.
Ibid., 140, emphasis added.

16
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the arguments themselves, and I can see instances where Firestone and
Jacobs deserve a response on the terms they have laid out before us. Nonetheless, my own effort is more accurately viewed as an invitation to reflect
on the wider perspective implied by my characterization of Kant as a cultural way-station between Luther and Marx within the West’s ongoing
referendum on supernaturalism and otherworldliness.
Perhaps another way of making this point is to draw on the difference
between “argument” and “sensibility.” In depicting difficulties within
Religion, I am not making a case for the book’s failure but, rather, suggesting that the book marks a transitional moment in a change in sensibility,
not altogether unlike the change in sensibility conveyed by my allusion
to French Impressionism. From my standpoint, Firestone and Jacobs’s attempts to “defend” Kant by showing both the coherence of Religion and
its broad compatibility with traditional Christianity is rather like an art
historian trying to argue for the compatibility of Manet’s breakthrough
with the earlier tradition of representational art. As I have put the matter elsewhere, the difference here between “argument” and “sensibility”
means that the instability affecting Kant’s Religion is not something he
“could ever have ‘corrected,’ but only lived through.”18 Even less, then,
is the instability the sort of thing against which he needs “defending.”
Consequently, to view my attempt at historical contextualizing as a prosecutorial gesture takes on the appearance of a co-opting gesture made for
the sake of the requirements of the courtroom drama.
It should be clear by now that the chief difference between Firestone
and Jacobs and me ultimately concerns the issue of Kant’s relation to the
trajectory of modern Christian thought. This overarching issue is more
fundamental to our differences than our particular approaches to this
or that individual textual issue in Religion. Firestone and Jacobs are also
more focused on the text of Religion viewed as a series of arguments that,
in their view, culminate in a unified account, rather than on Kant viewed
as symptomatic of larger issues. I was more explicit in clarifying my contrasting aims in the book following my study of radical evil, on which
Firestone and Jacobs concentrate the most attention, but the aims in both
cases were roughly the same. As I put it in the subsequent book, the project was not designed as a “technical specialized work intended mainly for
fellow members of the Kant guild,” nor was it intended to be an “introductory text.” Instead, it fell into a third category, that of studies designed
“to relate Kant to some broader interpretive theme in our philosophical,
religious, or cultural history.”19 I viewed that book as an extension of my
interest in the interplay between the human and divine, framed now in
terms of Kant’s supposed relationship to the liberal tradition of Protestant
mediating theology.

Ibid., 141.
Michalson, Kant and the Problem of God, vii.

18
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Once again, the aim was not to prosecute Kant but to depict his complicated role in a similarly complicated story extending far beyond the
boundaries of his own thought. To the extent that my rendering of his role
is inaccurate due to specific textual issues on which Firestone and Jacobs
offer a compelling corrective, I am surely open to correction. I simply take
issue with the notion that Kant needs “defending” from my modest efforts
to clarify his place in that larger story. Nor, so far as I can tell, does my
account involve any stake whatsoever in an issue of obviously considerable importance to Firestone and Jacobs, which concerns the degree of
unity of the text of Religion.
IV
A possible implication of my reservations about the way my own work
is characterized by Firestone and Jacobs is that they simply overplay the
entire motif of a “defense” of Kant. I can well appreciate an attempt, say,
to rehabilitate a Kantian account of a specific technical issue that has
garnered criticism, such as the apparent incompatibility of claiming that
radical evil is both “innate” and “freely” elected. But to structure an entire
narrative in terms of the motif of “defense” can produce a tendency to give
a more pejorative and adversarial edge to interpretive efforts that may
have been originally intended only to reveal what might otherwise remain hidden in the text or otherwise unacknowledged for lack of a broader
historical context. Given the large number of interpreters canvassed by
Firestone and Jacobs, it is no doubt true in a given instance or two that the
interpreter’s intent is indeed to criticize Kant for a serious argumentative
flaw or for a convoluted overall position. Still, when so many interpreters
are invoked in order to provide content to the courtroom in which the
defense is argued, there will inevitably be subtle warping effects as commentaries not designed for prosecutorial purposes are forced to conform
to the framework.
Worse, the power of the judicial motif is such that it deputizes Firestone
and Jacobs to remove important voices from the courtroom altogether.
When a Kant interpreter as profound as Yirmiahu Yovel is barred from
testifying at the outset simply on the grounds that he is a “hostile witness” who is not “welcome at the hearing,” (4) alarm bells invariably go
off, and one gets the uneasy feeling that arguments most challenging to
the authors’ central aim are simply eliminated by fiat. The case of Yovel
is telling, because the reason he is viewed as a “hostile witness” is not
that he disputes the unity or coherence of Religion. Rather, he is expelled
because Firestone and Jacobs take Yovel to be saying that Kant has nothing “positive or constructive to say about historical faith,” which means
that for Yovel “Religion is essentially ‘destructive’ to revealed religion” (4).
One might observe that, if this serious possibility has been eliminated at
the outset, then the more positive assessment of Kant’s view of revealed
religion embraced by Firestone and Jacobs is virtually assured. The more
important point, however, is that the response to Yovel vividly brings to
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the surface the authors’ deep stake in a certain view of Kant’s relation to
Christianity, with the accompanying possibility that this issue is finally
more determinative for them than the less loaded issue of the internal
coherence of Religion.
Finally, I suppose it says something about the current case that there
seems to be a long tradition of thinking that Kant needs defending. In
his recent life of Kant, Manfred Kuehn reminds us of the biography of
Kant rushed into print in the very year of his death by his friend and colleague, Ludwig Ernst Borowski. In partial explanation of the speed with
which the biography was produced, Kuehn observes that Borowski’s book
“at times takes the form of a defense” of his colleague.20 It was a defense
against accusations of impiety driven by “Kant’s reputation as an unbeliever” in his home city.21 Drawing on contemporary recollections, Kuehn
claims that there were those who “had often heard Kant scoff at prayer
and other religious practices. Organized religion filled him with ire. It
was clear to anyone who knew Kant personally that he had no faith in a
personal God.”22 Borowski himself evidently had his own reservations
about Kant’s religious views—to the point where he skipped Kant’s funeral—yet his biography took pains to show that Kant himself “was nothing like his work” and that “even his work, if properly understood, was not
as detrimental to the Christian religion as it may appear.”23
In thus carrying forward the tradition of defending Kant’s religious
outlook, Firestone and Jacobs have implicitly made the case for the compatibility of Kant’s Religion with Christianity in ways warranting detailed
responses from those who see matters differently. I admire their achievement and look forward to the further discussions their work will inevitably generate. Yet I would still press the point that the fact that their
view of Religion may go against the grain of much Kant scholarship is
hardly the same thing as claiming that Kant needs defending. Scholars
are obviously free to write the books they choose to write and not be
second-guessed by their readers. At the end of the day, however, “defending” Kant simply strikes me as analogous to “defending” Shakespeare—I
suppose you could do it, but the effort is rather like trying to protect Mt.
Rushmore from the rain with a sheet. Regardless of the success or failure
of your efforts, the monument will remain standing there in all its glory,
utterly undiminished.
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